NATO’s operation in Libya, Inter-Organizational Interests & a request for a new security framework.
NATO, Inter-Organizational collaboration, interests, new security framework.
NATO finally took over the operation in Libya; a result that was expected to happen. For the supporters of engagement, supporters of the use of military force and for allied collective work, the operation of NATO in Libya will be seen as a result of an agreement to further share and enhance amongst others abilities, capabilities and actions. NATO operation in Libya is therefore considered a natural evolution of its security related affairs and reaction to the new challenges raised ahead as was seen from NATO’s glance in the very near past. Decisions on reactions and eventually involvement were agreed at the recent November 2010 Lisbon summit of NATO in the conclusion of its new Strategic Concept. We are thus now seeing the Strategic Concept being unlocked and its military options introduced.
The new Strategic Concept is applied at its primary operational level. It is assumed, that NATO’s capabilities although applied, will not reach a full operational force. NATO is not just ready yet for a full deployment of its capabilities and forces but neither wants to as allies and governments question the financial expenses of such actions.
The operation of NATO in Libya will also practically complement the decisions made in November 2002 to transform the Alliance. It will create new capabilities in operations that will go beyond the sphere of NATO’s influence. We can therefore say that we are now seeing the influence of NATO in its immediate periphery, unlike the earliest operation in its immediate region (Kosovo 1999).
NATO today embraces the legal status, the modus operandi and the political will to be engaged in peripheral operations. The initiative of France, Great Britain and the United States of America, is now complemented and agreed by NATO Ministers of Defense, External Affairs and NATO’s Military Committee. It complements the initiatives of the initially involved states on the basis that it is time to put an end to internal or external conflicts. Conflicts can include cross-border or inner-border conflicts, micro-wars and estimated quasi civil wars as well as humanitarian disasters in countries that were historically pre-end of the Cold War but post-Cold War still considered unstable.
Regional and peripheral interests, individual or collective, of course exist and shall always be put forward or indirectly implied for countries or joint peripheral organizations to be involved. Natural resources, maritime security, access and control of the Mediterranean region and the need of internal placement due to climate change are some of the key motivations for involvement in unstable countries and areas.
In contrast with 20th history events, the aforementioned interests are now considered interests of joined concern. Theoretically speaking, inside joined interest of NATO involvement, lay individual interests, which are also raised (e.g the position of Turkey vis a vis the crisis in the Mediterranean region). Nonetheless joined supranational interests of mutual concern such as climate change and energy resources can in fact be applied as a motivation tools for joint collaboration.
Under practical incentives, pressure and need for sudden military rules of engagement, an international community reaction is considered essential. Motivation tools of joined supranational interests can be therefore applied directly to peripheral organizations as a motive for collaboration between states and amongst organizations and not by firstly and only justifying the interests of countries separately (coalitions of the willing), all under the auspice of the United Nations.
At this given time frame, the engagement of the UN, NATO, the EU, the Arab-League and eventually the African Union, looks as an opportunity to create a new inter-organizational security framework of collaboration; sometimes, even led by an ‘observatory’ of initiating countries with the capacity and capability to lead current or future operations. The very recent London Summit on Libya on the 29th March 2011, testifies to this end. Its conclusions led to some of the initiating countries to examine possibilities of swifter and tighter actions to end the existing crisis in Libya.
There must be a procedure that allows the UN to proceed to the clarification of what consists as an escalating threat and what needs a consistent and joined decision for reaction.
There must be a process for swift projection planning with a practical impact factor that informs the UN and peripheral organizations of the future stability or instability of states and or regions.
There must be swifter decisions of the UN Security Council Resolutions and swifter decisions on direct sanctions.
UN-Inter-Organizational collaboration should be put as a direct primary policy agenda in the UN as current challenges and future threats emerge one by one: 1. there is a financial and operational burden sharing amongst organizations that lower financial expenses 2. Some organizations of peripheral importance may work in a far greater consistent planning procedure than the UN. 3. The UN’s ongoing Transformation and such collaboration may lead to the wider acceptance of both the future role of the UN and peripheral organizations in global political and security affairs 4. More powers are indirectly handed over to the regional organizations that are and will be involved in future actions 5. Such action re-affirms that all involved parties and joined collaboration of organizations can be legalized in practice only if empowered by the UN and its Security Council Resolutions.
For NATO its operation to Libya provides justification of moral values in its involvement in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It enhances its role in the Mediterranean region. It provides a motivation tool for swifter political and operational changes according to its new Strategic Concept. Essentially justifies for all national financial and political expenses made by the Allies. Projects new age strategic collaboration amongst states that face moral and ethical questions in being part of a political military Alliance that can only be the most valid Alliance since the end of the Second World War.
It is a Win win situation. Peripheral organizations such as the Arab League or African Union enhance their abilities and capabilities. It is estimated that they will soon be requested to make more and new reforms to be inter-organizationally interoperable. Thus they are directly denied the financial crisis since they are now requested to invest in security, stability and development affairs.
Overall, what is to be said that a global financial, civilian and military is now also a crisis of total regional concern and has a name: The Mediterranean region. Yet it should be seen as an opportunity for growth and development. Conflict and war in the region should end. Mass investment and re-introduction of opportunities should be created in a post-conflict environment; where interests, individual and collective will and shall be portrayed.
This article has been published by Dr. Efthymiopoulos on Europe’s World site (http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/CommunityPosts/tabid/809/PostID/2374/language/en-US/Default.aspx).